

## **From a Nest of Rivals to Germany's Agents of Change: Remarks on 'Values and Conflicts' with Regard to the German Greens in the 1980s and 1990s<sup>1</sup>**

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Among the most conspicuous characteristics of the German Greens is not only their record of electoral success but also a history of internal division and fierce conflict. It was not until 1998 that conflict ceased to be endemic in the party. The German Greens were founded in 1979 by a rainbow coalition composed of people with considerably different values, world views and long-term goals. There was little common understanding beside the aim of forming a party distinct from all existing parties and promoting a number of hitherto neglected causes.

### **“German Exceptionalism” and the Rise of the Greens**

Assessing the factors that allowed for the significant and rather unparalleled success of the German Greens demands a brief examination of the historical context in which they occurred. The German Greens appear to be exceptional not only because their career as a political party began relatively early in comparison with Green Parties elsewhere. They are also exceptional in the sense that they filled a structural gap in Germany's political system and culture. In order to understand the political culture from which the German Greens emerged—and in opposition to which they would successfully portray themselves—one has to recall the peculiar features of German post-war history.

West Germany after the downfall of the Hitler regime had to invent a new politico-cultural identity. Given the truly disastrous experiences between imperial Germany and the Third Reich, the new identity, not surprisingly, avoided explicitly political rhetoric and instead centered on pride in the German “economic miracle” of the 1950s, the so-called *Wirtschaftswunder*. This was accompanied by rejecting communism and socialism while simultaneously downplaying, if not outright ignoring, Germany's recent history. Thus post-war Germany was characterized not so much by

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social or class divisions as by a political cleavage. In comparison with the majority—probably 90 per cent—of consumer-minded, security-oriented, and politically abstinent citizens, there was only a small minority of left-wing, left-liberal souls who wished to focus on the past and who had a critical attitude to the self-satisfied society of the Federal Republic. The liberal, pluralist society of the Federal Republic, with its capacity for self-critical analysis, emerged only in the late 1960s. And it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that Germans began to seriously come to terms with their National Socialist past, a process known in Germany as *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*.

Another important backdrop to the founding of the Green party were the explosive events of 1977, when a wave of left-wing terrorist actions coincided with the last surge of the mass movement against the construction of nuclear power stations. If 1968 had been the symbol of a period of liberalization overlaid with utopian revolutionary ideas, the so-called “German autumn” of 1977 symbolized the concerns that a pluralist-liberal democracy, in response to a perceived political “crisis,” could give way to a more authoritarian model of state rule. For many on the German left, the lesson of 1977 was that violent revolution was counter-productive and was only likely to lead to a repressive government with broad popular support. Revolution, if it were to occur at all, would have to be carried out by peaceful means.

Among those engaged in the organizing activities were representatives of the local ‘alternative’ and ‘colored’ (*bunte*) initiatives which had been created to facilitate participation in municipal elections. Other participants included pioneers of ecological thought and critics of industrial civilization, disillusioned social democrats, and, last but not least, the remains of the small-scale parties left over from the student movement, including “non-dogmatic” socialists and Marxist-Leninists. These groups had in common a critique of modern society, viewing it as a logical consequence of capitalism, the dead end of industrialization, or the vicious cycle of party politics. Whereas all groups in the founding assembly were eager to promote the arrival of something “new” and distance themselves from social democracy and communism, there was only a loose agreement over an anti-institutional understanding of politics and democracy as well as a quest for thorough institutional reforms. Everything else regarding the party’s profile and platforms was intensely disputed.

Leaving aside the early frustration felt by prominent representatives of the civilization critique (such as Herbert Gruhl and Baldur Springmann) who left the party soon after its founding, the period from 1980 until 1987 was marked by the dominance of the more radical segments over the moderates and so-called realists. The enduring conflict saw two groups on either side: the “Fundis” presented themselves as an alliance of radical ecologists and eco-socialists, while the “Realos” most often enjoyed the collaboration of the eco-libertarians. Later on, a considerable share of the moderate and mostly undecided majority found themselves on the benches of the group called “New Beginning” (Aufbruch).

There were three issues in particular that gave rise to much conflict during these years: the Greens’ collective identity, the party’s role in politics, and, last but not least, its organizational form. They will be dealt with in this order.

### **The Conflict over Collective Identity**

A major theme of conflict was the degree to which the Greens should base their collective identity on a radical critique of the status quo. The more radical elements insisted on a harsh critique of the capitalist market economy, its legal framework and the existing measures of social security. The minority of moderate members, on the other hand, fought for a more precise and careful diagnoses of reality, though their efforts were often futile. This conflict intensified during the second half of the 1980s when the radical wing retained its critique of the entire “system,” while the realists argued in favor of policy priorities that would fit into coalition agreements.

The realists’ position implied that there were some features of society, such as civil and political liberties, that deserve to be maintained and even extended instead of being viewed merely as symbols. Those who were more radically inclined gravitated toward conspiracy theories (e.g. of a symbiosis of financial capital, the US government and NATO) or the idea of returning to simple rural life. For the fundamentalists, this kind of radicalism served as proof of one’s proper “Green” identity.

In contrast to what early admirers of the Greens (e.g. Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak, 1984) suggested, the first decade offers no proof of the hypothesis that a common basic stance or central idea developed among the German Greens. Instead, from the beginning, there existed considerable differences—and indeed rivalry—between competing models of identity including some brands of anarchism, deep

ecology, philosophical reasoning, Marxism and liberalism. However, because none of these [belief patterns groups](#) succeeded in forming a well-organized group, let alone a caucus, the plethora of minor identities added further confusion to the overriding conflict over the options of radical opposition or participation in government. It was almost a decade before the Party abandoned its radical revolutionary attitudes and began working for more piecemeal social and political changes.

There is also a structural explanation for the Greens' susceptibility to radical thinking and ideological conflict. Because green politics is occupied with an array of conflicting issues touching on almost all social spheres—from production, through upbringing and education, state and law, science and technology, to patterns of consumption and individual life-styles—there is no single concise “key issue” and no permanent “primary enemy.” As far as the choice of political ends and means was concerned, simple dichotomies such as the historical cleavage between labor and capital or the distinction between “true and false,” “good and evil,” and “us and them” proved insufficient. The diffuse and often fluctuating structure of conflicts would inevitably manifest itself in problems of orientation.

Radicalization of thought and desire are one way of constructing group identity and stabilizing involvement. Obviously, this is a structural feature—and probably the main reason why catastrophic scenarios, apocalyptic forecasts, and an impassioned critique of civilization and capitalism proved so significant during the Greens' first decade of existence. Radical social diagnoses and therapies appeared to offset the lack of a fully-developed theory after the crisis of Marxism and, at the same time, helped to cope with the centrifugal tendencies inherent in postmodern “new” social movements: i.e. their extremely subjective and particularistic incentive pattern combined with a strong preference for autonomy that runs counter to nearly all the requirements of formal organization.

From the beginning, the fundamentalists' inability to tolerate ambiguities that were real and rooted in the operational context hindered the Greens from developing their potential for influencing society. This was most clearly demonstrated in their radical posturing on peace policy (e.g. “Out of NATO!”), on women's policy (which was always modeled on the life-style of the most radical feminists of the day), on German unity (which was declared to be the resurrection of the German Reich), or on the first Gulf War (seen as an example of US imperialism).

## **The Conflict over the Party's Role in Politics**

The strategic alternatives of either participating in coalition governments or relying on the “power” of social movements meant that the early Green Party was split into two opposing worldviews and political value systems. On the surface, the rejection of participation in government was rooted in the fear of compromising central features of the party's identity. However, it became clear in the mid-1980s that the radicals' plan was to wait for, and if possible contribute to, a situation of revolutionary turmoil that would abolish capitalist relations of production and introduce some variant of socialism, together with institutions of self-governance and direct democracy. From this perspective, violent illegal action, such as the destruction of high-voltage cables during anti-nuclear campaigns, appeared to be an appropriate tactic. In the absence of a revolutionary situation, political practice was seen to consist primarily in the manifestation of identities and intentions. Parliament was to be used only as a “stage” rather than as a means of participating in the elaboration of policy decisions, let alone the formation of governmental coalitions.

This position, however, suffered from declining support among the membership because, following the party's success in local and state elections, an increasing number of people enjoyed the opportunity of participating in policy-making. Thus, the radical wing lost their hold on the majority of delegates in party conventions with increasing frequency. At the same time, the option of Red–Green coalitions began to appear a viable one in more and more states, though this had more to do with the growing dissatisfaction among voters with conservative–liberal coalitions than with the proposals of reform put forward by the SPD and Greens. Furthermore, many grew increasingly weary of the fundamentalist plea for a critical attitude to the system and for abstinence from politics. This led to a decline in the number of votes won in the fundamentalist strongholds as more Greens were attracted to the opportunities offered by participating in government. Thus, even in radical regional party organs, the option of political co-operation began to attract a majority of members.

In 1989, Greens finally managed to break out of the prison of radicalism. On the one hand, the decline and final collapse of state socialism in the USSR, Poland, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic eradicated any remnant sympathy for

their discredited Marxist ideologies. On the other hand, the decision of the West Berlin Greens, a party organization with an indisputably leftist tradition, to form a municipal government with the SPD constituted a genuine breakthrough, leading the Berlin Greens down the more pragmatic and productive road that had been taken by Realo-led Greens in Hessen in 1985 (see Hubert Kleinert's article in this volume). This pattern was followed shortly afterwards by the Greens in Lower Saxony.

Now, the traditional alliance between fundamentalists and 'left-wingers' in the regional executive committees of North Rhine-Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hamburg began to collapse. In 1990, the [leading 'eco-socialists' in Hamburg split from Rainer Trampert and Thomas Ebermann's split from the party](#) [Fundi-dominated group](#). Similarly, in the spring of 1991, the radical ecologists around Jutta Ditfurth also announced their departure. Now even moderate "left-wingers" joined in the critique of fundamentalism. Their willingness to team up with the pragmatic Realos, their erstwhile enemies, helped to strengthen the party's capacity for integration and political action at the state and federal levels.

### **The Conflict over the Party's Organizational Form**

Radicals and realists fought for different models of organizational structure and development, the former seeking the realization of utopian ideals, the latter striving for decision-making efficiency and effectiveness as a political actor in society. As is well known, the Greens' approach to politics has a formal as well as a material (or policy-oriented) side. There has been an attempt, through the choice of organizational structures and procedural rules, to take account of the fact that attitudes and preferences do not simply flow into the party from outside but are also shaped by the party itself, indeed are in some cases self-generated. What the party wants and how it acts is dependent to an important degree on how it is organized. In order to guarantee that members' interests would always be represented, something that is difficult to achieve within the confines of bureaucratic organizations and hierarchical decision-making structures, the Greens expressly pledged themselves to the principles of "grass-roots democracy."

These principles are familiar from the anarchist traditions of the labor movement. The Greens established the principle of the rotation of official posts, which allowed for short periods of office (from one to two years) and prevented the

re-election of office-holders. They prohibited the simultaneous holding of a number of offices, particularly the combination of a party office and a parliamentary mandate (the so-called “incompatibility rule”). They experimented with the “imperative mandate,” which binds delegates to the resolutions of the body that has delegated them. And they tried, prompted in part by a lack of funds, to fulfill most organizational tasks using voluntary, honorary, and unpaid workers rather than a paid staff.

The effect of establishing grass-roots democracy within the early Greens was highly ambiguous. Above all, one has to distinguish between the effect which it had outside the Greens and that which it had on the Greens themselves. The “external” effects of the Green experiment in democracy can be adjudged to have been unreservedly positive, and continue to be felt to this day. The fact that organizations could not only function, but also be politically effective without permanent functionaries ensured a high degree of empowerment for the rank and file. Furthermore, a high level of transparency in all formal procedures proved a surprising success. These aspects of the Green Party were widely admired and affected many other organizations, prompting them to develop more democratic structures and transparent decision making processes.

Of course, the internal effects were somewhat less positive. The formal application of the principle of rotation, of the incompatibility rule, and of various other forms of “grass-roots monitoring” of elected party representatives produced the same sort of tendencies toward alienation and detachment as would a rigid ruling hierarchy. Instead of a lively organizational democracy, what frequently developed, as the sociologist, Herbert Kitschelt, has noted, was a “culture of distrust” (1989a, p. 72).

Because the fundamentalists were the ones who continually devoted themselves to the development of the organization and, until very recently, held the majority in party congresses, they had a monopoly on the intellectual interpretation of the party's image. The impassioned defense of grass-roots principles and any issues concerning the organizational form of politics were declared to be key political issues. In particular, younger fundamentalists regarded the formal principles of grass-roots democracy as having great value in themselves. This inclination impacted heavily on what in 1990 became the major problem of the Greens' internal process; their inability, as Joachim Raschke noted (1991, p. 10), to combine legitimacy and efficiency. What they regarded as legitimate—laxer rules of membership and a high degree of

fluctuation, institutionalized distrust and intense self-reflection—proved inefficient when it came to the reality of everyday politics. However, the things that would have improved efficiency—the fostering of creativity, the ability to communicate and cooperate, the delegation of responsibility for a fixed term, the acknowledgement and corroboration of successful work—were considered illegitimate.

When the Greens failed to secure entry into the first all-German parliament in December 1990, they were not just paying the penalty for having shown themselves to be indecisive and petty-minded vis-à-vis the historic opportunity offered by unification; their predicament was also a consequence of their confusing “performance,” a result of the distrust fomented by Greens against other Greens.

Did all these harmful features vanish once the Greens began participating in the federal government? The answer, clearly, is no. Although the party undertook a thorough organizational reform in the mid-1990s, in the course of which most rigidities of grass-roots democracy were abolished, collective decision-making procedures still appear to be aggravated by the needs of addressing constituencies with diverging values. Because of frequent compromising between the divergent demands and expectations of the rank-and-file, the time horizon of strategic planning remains rather limited (Raschke, 2001). However, this is not to deny that great improvements, in terms of political rationality, did eventually occur.

### **Exactly how was Fundamentalism Overcome?**

~~As a consequence of the Green lobbyists joining forces with the moderates and the pragmatists, the radicalism of the Fundis ceased to be the central feature of the party's collective identity. Hesitancy, indecision and endless debates over points of protocol and political correctness all began to wane.~~ The end of fundamentalism could well be described as a process of political learning undertaken by the entire party. This, however, is only part of the explanation. In fact, one has to acknowledge a twofold process. On the one hand, fundamentalism suffered from its inherent inconsistencies and a certain lack of clarity. This was demonstrated by the willingness and enthusiasm of its most prominent proponents to work for favourable election results. Even if the new members of parliament felt a degree of affiliation with the radicals, they soon felt dissatisfied with the relative powerlessness of the parliamentary opposition and began to see partnership in government as a valid alternative. This only increased as the

stronger Green representatives felt driven to enact certain policies which they had promoted during their election campaigns.

Until the mid-1980s the fundamentalists were the ones who continually devoted themselves to the development of both the party platform and the party's organization. Because they held the majority in party congresses, they also had a monopoly on the intellectual interpretation of the party's image. It was thanks to this monopoly that a rather strange looking reversion to the traditions of the early workers' movement took place in the early 1980s. In their rhetoric and schemes for institutional reform, their goals of socializing the means of production, and their efforts to establish a system of councils that would run parallel to, or in place of parliament, the Greens of the 1980s were like throwbacks to the 19<sup>th</sup> century labor movement.

At this time, there was a gulf between the self-constructed identity of the Greens, on the one side, and their public perception as a fresh and innovative political actor, on the other. The Greens achieved significant gains in state and federal elections despite their radical and neo-socialist orientation. At the same time, the general public and the mass media continued to picture the Greens as an environmental party with an interest in the rights of minorities and women. Although the conflict between the radical and the realist wing found broad coverage in the media, the realists proved superior in forming the Greens' public image.

While electoral success led to the broadening of the Green constituency beyond the narrow strata of well-informed or devoted voters, participating in parliament gave rise to the development of an additional factor undermining fundamentalism: Green political lobbying. Newly formed lobby groups within the party contributed greatly to the change in the party's image as well as the processes whereby its objectives were formulated. Green lobbyists came in two versions. The first were those who represented more or less legitimate individual interests, namely those involved in self-managed businesses or projects (e.g. production companies, bookshops, alternative newspapers, cultural centers, music and theater groups). The second group advocated the kinds of collective interests that feature prominently in the catalogue of post-materialist politics. These include citizens' initiatives, environmental or conservation groups, women's groups, and immigrants and foreign workers. Both lobbies succeeded in persuading the fundamentalists to support their particular, more realistic and more short-term political objectives. In return, they gave their backing to the fundamentalists

when it was a question of occupying positions of influence or of defending “radical” formulas of identity against the pragmatists' practical view of politics.

However, because the “lobbyists” had no scruples about allying themselves with the “pragmatists”—especially in the lead-up to important elections—they more frequently held fundamentalism in check and, in fact, encouraged the pragmatists to stick with the Greens. Although the “lobbyists” were initially scarcely less radical than the fundamentalists, the experience of parliamentary participation led them to adopt a view of politics that was closer to that of the pragmatists. As policy experts they enjoyed a certain amount of attention in the media and were respected even by officials of other parties—a fact which increasingly had a beneficial effect on both their worldview and the interests which they represented. [As a consequence of the Green lobbyists joining forces with the moderates and the pragmatists, the radicalism of the Fundis ceased to be the central feature of the party's collective identity. Hesitancy, indecision and endless debates over points of protocol and political correctness all began to wane.](#)

Strictly speaking, the ideological dominance of fundamentalism was broken not so much by the intrinsically superior arguments of the pragmatists, but rather, as a consequence of the party's changing profile in the wake of favorable election results, which themselves were the result of co-operation between pragmatists and lobbyists. This continuous change of profile and self-image resulted in many fundamentalists leaving the party, thus increasing the share of moderate and pragmatic members. However, according to what Kitschelt refers to as the “law of curvilinear disparity” (1989b), party functionaries, with their more radical aspirations, frequently maintained their dominance over the assembly of delegates. This, paradoxically, gave rise to the recent conflict over the right of the rank and file to decide over the reform of grass-roots democracy mentioned above. The poll was held against the will of the erstwhile advocates of grass-roots' power.

### **Favorable Circumstances Furthered the Emergence of the Greens**

The German Greens benefited from an institutional setting that provided strong incentives for overcoming their self-destructive tendencies. The joint political project that the Green Party effectively constituted filled a gap of a kind that was unknown in the political systems of other Western European countries; namely, the lack of a

genuine socialist opposition. The division of Germany into the Federal and Democratic Republics, the exigencies of the Cold War, and the semi-official anti-communism of the Federal Republic all conspired to insure that West Germany, unlike Italy and France, had no genuinely radical political parties of any significance. The Greens, therefore, found themselves pushed into this role, becoming the de facto representatives of social minorities, the systematic advocates of the effective enforcement of equal rights for women, and the champions of egalitarian principles and morally sound decisions.

The fact that the Greens did not collapse under this strain but instead managed to establish themselves within the network of political actors in the Federal Republic can be credited to the effect of various institutional “pull-factors” which provided the Greens with a favorable opportunity structure. Briefly, these factors include:

1. German electoral law, under which all parties at the various levels of representation obtain parliamentary seats in proportion to the votes cast.

2. The “five-per-cent-clause”, which performs the function of preventing a fragmentation of the party-system. As far as the creation of the Greens was concerned, this rule was a strong incentive—perhaps the decisive incentive—to construct the party as an alliance of differently oriented forces. Had it not been for the institutional pressure to put aside the many differences that existed, it is doubtful that the Greens would have formed a viable political party in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

3. The party system in the Federal Republic owes its stability not only to what Jürgen Habermas referred to as the post-war “constitutional patriotism” of its citizens, but also to certain institutional precautions against the populist temptations eventually experienced by the political parties. Probably the stoutest pillar among these measures is the public financial support granted to the parties—the so-called *Wahlkampfkostenerstattung*—which constitutes a legally based system of party finance. It provides parties that win at least 0.5 per cent of the vote with a generous refund of their electoral campaign costs according to their record in state and national elections.

4. The fact that the federal structure of the German political system provides comparatively favorable opportunities for new parties to develop. It is relatively easy to acquire the initial experience and a public profile through participation in local elections (for seats in the city council) or in elections for the state parliament. The state parliaments as well as local governments offer many opportunities for new political groups to make their mark.

5. The fact that there is positive feedback as a result of the close links between the parliamentarian and the corporatist forms of interest representation. Due to the corporatist nature of Germany's political system, parliamentary representatives enjoy ample opportunities to take part in consultative and supervisory organs of various kinds. Thanks to these opportunities, even small parties benefit from the multiplier effect of media coverage.

In sum, the combined effect of these five elements of relative openness in the political system meant that the Green Party emerged as the result of a favorable political opportunity structure. Within this structure, new political actors receive plenty of incentives to view their success as an endorsement of their political program and of their peculiar interpretation of reality, regardless of its inherent strengths and weaknesses.

### **The Greens' Impact on Society**

With the rise of the Green Party the entire party system, as well as Germany's political culture, underwent considerable change. The Greens not only functioned as vehicles for environmental interests and the concerns of disadvantaged groups, but also as monitors of the conduct of governments, mayors, and administrations. With great persistence they set about uncovering corruption, tacit partnerships between politicians and business, and instances where authorities had exceeded their legal power. The influence of the Greens is thus scarcely measurable in terms of mere votes. Their very presence, their politics, and even their internal disputes have left unmistakable marks. This is illustrated by the following points:

1. The general acceptance and "normalization" of environmental issues, is not, of course, due solely to the Greens. But they have clearly had an enormous impact in promoting and reinforcing such issues. By transporting the doubts, critical viewpoints, and anxieties of the social movements into the political system and securing a hearing for "counter-experts," they helped expand the sphere of political debate.

2. Somewhat less striking but no less important is the political change of style fostered by the Greens. Whether because of the dialectic of communicative understanding or because of the career opportunities which up-and-coming non-green politicians saw in a "serious" approach to environmental issues, the style and themes of green politics—and indeed something of the radical impetus of the early Greens—

became part of West German political culture. A positive view of pluralism established itself, in which even the representatives of the 'fundamentalist' position enjoyed respect and achieved a certain prominence in the media. Mention should also be made of the successes brought about by the Green-inspired "feminization" of politics, initially confined to the symbolic realm but now a yardstick for women's demands and women's presence in all political bodies.

3. One of the surprising, and perhaps paradoxical, effects of the Greens in the 1980s was the reinforcement of left–right polarization in inter-party rivalry. This has several causes. One is related to the "political ecology" developed by the Greens. Given that many environmental interventions are restrictive in character, it was calculated that there would have to be trade-offs in terms of income and employment. Unjust accusation that they were hostile toward the working class greatly affected the Greens, who saw themselves as both critical of capitalism and concerned about the social welfare of workers. They responded with even more voluminous programs of state expenditure, which, like those of the Social Democrats, adhered to Keynesian logic. But because both business and a majority of the electorate opposed higher taxes and higher public borrowing, the Greens suffered similar credibility problems as the SPD, particularly when it came to managing the economy.

4. The most significant success produced by this competition between Greens and Social Democrats is undoubtedly the transformation of both the political style and program of the SPD. The Greens provided the Social Democrats with a strong incentive to strengthen their ecological credentials, which subsequently improved the party's prospects with younger voters. One problematic consequence, however, was that the SPD transformed itself rather too quickly into a "post-modern" party, leaving behind older and more traditionally oriented voters. The same thing occurred when the Red-Green government decided to embark upon a program of economic liberalization, budget cuts and reduction in welfare spending. Such policies alienated core elements of the SPD's traditional constituency and caused a considerable number of its supporters to transfer their support to the conservatives or various populists. [Thus, the Greens contributed, in significant ways, to the electoral decline of Germany's Social Democracy as it, in 2005, manifested itself in the parliamentary presence of a united left party \(Linkspartei\).](#)

## **A Final Remark on the German Greens as an Object of Myth**

More than any other green party, the history of the German Greens has come to be associated with a number of myths, all of which obscure our understanding of the party's origins. Firstly, there is the myth that the founding and early electoral successes of the German Greens were due to a particularly strong ecological and pacifist mood in West German society. However, unconditional pacifism and the ecological critique of civilization that was advanced by the radical ecologists were present in only a tiny proportion of the population and only among a minority of Green Party members.

Secondly, the belief that the German Greens were created by charismatic personalities such as Petra Kelly, Rudi Dutschke and Rudolf Bahro continues to have currency in both mainstream society and among many Greens. Although these personalities made extremely valuable contributions to the development of Green ideology and political culture, their influence on the overall evolution of the party was minimal in comparison with the broad structural factors outlined above.

Finally, there is the myth that the Greens began as a single-issue party dominated by environmental concerns, before embracing a broader set of political goals and thereby attracting a wider constituency. On the contrary, history reveals that, from the very beginning, the German Greens concerned themselves with the full range of ecological, economic, and social justice issues that formed their ambitious program of societal renewal.

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